Abstract. Ensuring the correctness of a given software component has become a crucial aspect in software engineering and model checking provides an almost fully automatic way of achieving this goal. Due to the scalability problems of the model checking technique, it has become popular to apply it at early stages in the development process, when the size of the model is much smaller than the final code. Properties proved in this way can be shown to hold at the implementation level provided that the final code refines the original specification. In this paper we focus on the main issues for adding model checking functionality to the RAISE specification language (RSL) and present the semantic foundations of our current approach for doing so. We also describe a way to use model checking to verify RAISE confidence conditions, ensuring the soundness and completeness of the results checked in this way. We then present the most interesting details of the implementation of a tool that follows the described approach. Finally, we illustrate the application of the technique with two case studies: a Digital Multiplexed Radio Telephone System and the Mondex electronic purse.
Introduction
Model checking is a method to algorithmically verify formal systems [CGP99] . This is achieved by verifying if the model, often derived from a hardware or software design, satisfies a formal specification. The model is usually expressed as a transition system where a set of atomic propositions is associated with each node. The nodes represent states of a system, the transitions represent the actions that may alter the state, while the atomic propositions represent the basic properties that hold at each point of execution.
The utilization of model checking for software verification has been subject of significant research and study during the last decades [CGP99, BBF + 98, FW06] . The increasing popularity of model checking is due to the high level of automation achieved (compared to other verification techniques such as testing or proof). Moreover, the ability to produce counterexamples when a given property is not satisfied provides useful insight when debugging After analysing SPIN [Hol03] , NuSMV [CCGR99] and the Symbolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL) [dMOR + 04] as possible target languages for a translation, the decision was made in favour of translating into SAL instead of an in-house development. The decision was made, mainly, based on the following considerations (a fuller discussion on this topic can be found in [PG05] ):
• We expected an in-house development of a model checker customised particularly for RSL to have less syntactic/semantic restrictions than translating to an already developed model checker. We found out that this was not the case given the expressive power of the SAL's input language and its closeness to the subset of RSL we are interested in verifying.
• The possible advantages regarding efficiency that may be achieved by a particular solution (that might take advantage of certain constructs in RAISE) are outweighed by SAL's multiple optimisation techniques (slicing, boolean abstraction, etc.).
As to why SAL was preferred to other model checkers, a major consideration was the richness of its type system compared to others. SAL's DATATYPE feature was essential, for example, in creating the "lifted" types we used for checking confidence conditions.
As mentioned before, the aim of this work is not only to provide a useful tool that allows one to automatically verify RSL specifications but also the confidence conditions associated with them. It turns out that the most useful approach for model checking properties of specifications is to use a "shallow embedding" [BGG + 92] of RSL in SAL. But this approach is limited, since the shallow embedding is not a complete model of the RSL semantics. For example, it will not detect the application of a function when its precondition is not satisfied. We therefore use a second, deeper embedding of RSL in SAL in order to be able to check confidence conditions (such as precondition satisfaction). We refer to this second version as the "CC" version and the first as the "normal" version. We will see that satisfactory model checking of the CC version is a guarantee of validity of model checks using the normal version.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 describes the translation from RSL to SAL in the normal version; Sect. 3 describes the extensions to RSL to support the definition of transition systems and temporal logic formulae; Sect. 4 describes the CC version; Sect. 5 presents the application of the technique to two case studies; and Sect. 6 summarises the paper, compares it to other work in the area, and suggests some future directions.
Basic approach: the normal version
The automatic verification of a RAISE applicative specification and the confidence conditions associated with it is achieved by means of translating the specification into the SAL input language. This task poses several challenges, regarding (a) efficiency of the generated code, (b) soundness of the translation and (c) completeness. Efficiency is a crucial factor due to the exploratory nature and the state explosion problem of model checking. On the other hand, the soundness of the translation is necessary in order to ensure that the errors found by the model checker have their counterpart (i.e. exist) in the original RAISE specification. Finally, the approach should be complete in order to ensure that if an error exists, it will be found by the model checker.
There is typically a choice to be made at this point because the goals of completeness and execution efficiency are generally in conflict. Our primary aim is a usable model checker, so efficient execution should be the primary goal (indicating a direction towards a shallow embedding of RAISE in SAL). It is well accepted, however, that shallow embedding approaches are likely to be less complete (in comparison to deep embeddings) by favouring the usage of the corresponding (and more efficient) constructs of the target language [BGG + 92] . In our case, it is possible to use SAL's applicative subset in order to produce a shallow embedding of most of RAISE's applicative constructs.
The main limitation of this approach arises in the case of partially defined functions (which are not supported by SAL). As partial functions can be considered total under appropriately restricted domains [MS97] , the solution adopted for the normal version is to translate them as total functions and to promote all the partiality constraints as assumptions of the verification procedure. We will then use the deeper embedding of the CC version to discharge these assumptions. More formally: the model checking verification method is usually stated as deciding if M , s | p, where p is a user property (expressed in temporal logic) and M is a model of the system under analysis with initial state s. In this context, our normal approach can be stated as verifying M ∧ R, s | p, where R is the conjunction of the system's confidence conditions. The CC version is used to verify M , s | R, where M and s are enriched versions of M and s.
Applicative RSL
RSL is a "wide spectrum" language: specifications may be applicative or imperative, sequential or concurrent. The advice in the RAISE method [Gro95] is to start with an applicative sequential specification, and this is the kind of specification we want to translate into SAL. We will from now on drop "sequential" and refer to this subset of RSL as "applicative": an applicative concurrent style is rarely used. Applicative specifications are essentially a collection of types and functions over them. Readers familiar with other applicative languages, such as SML, should have no difficulty reading the examples. The language of SAL is in large part similar to RSL and so again should be quite readable. SAL has a similar expressive power to applicative RSL, except that it can only deal with systems that are finite and defined non-recursively. The translation to SAL gives descriptions that are much the same length as the RSL descriptions: much of the translation is one to one, with RSL features translating directly into corresponding SAL ones.
There are three main problems to be overcome in translating RSL to SAL. First, there are some features of RSL that are not reflected in SAL. Some such features can be defined using other features of SAL, others are not translatable because they are either not finite or inherently recursive. Second, while SAL is modular, its modules are different from those of RSL, which has in particular a more powerful parameterisation mechanism. The details of how modules are treated are beyond the scope of this paper and may be found in [PG05] . Third, there is nothing in RSL like the transition systems and temporal properties of SAL. To deal with this we essentially copied the SAL syntax for transition systems and temporal logic assertions and added them to RSL syntax, while making them more consistent with RSL syntactic conventions.
A simple example
We illustrate with a simple example how a transition system and some linear temporal logic (LTL) assertions may be included in an RSL specification, which can be translated into SAL and model checked. The interchange of 6 tokens tokens between two repositories S1 and S2 is modelled. The repositories are modelled as sets and the operations for token interchange are also shown: give21 moves a token from S2 to S1, and give12 does the converse. After this, a transition system is used to describe the state machine that uses give21 and give12 from the specification to define the behaviour of the system. A possible transition is to move a token from a non-empty repository to the other. Note the usage of the precondition of each function as a guard for its execution, guaranteeing their correct application for this example.
It is also worth noticing the comprehended multiple guarded transitions (by means of the creation of a quantified variable over the type Token in the example). This construction allows the definition of transition systems that are expanded at run time depending on the types in the specification.
Finally, four properties are stated about the system. consistent asserts that there is no token replication due to the interchange (i.e. the system remains consistent).
1 no loss asserts that no token will be lost due to the interchange of tokens. These two assertions are both declared valid (true) by SAL. The other two assertions are typical simple liveness properties, proved in fact by asserting something we expect to be false. By asserting, in the first of these, that set S1 is never empty the system shows a counterexample of transferring tokens a, b and c from S1 to S2. Had we tried asserting that S1 must become empty (i.e. F(S1(state) {})) another counterexample would have been found, such as the infinite loop of transferring token a from S1 to S2 and back again. It is not true that S1 must become empty, but we can show through counterexample generation that it may become empty.
The remainder of this section is dedicated to describing how we deal with the first of these three problems in the normal version of the translator, considering the constructs from RSL-we assume some knowledge of RSL syntactic constructs and their semantics, see [Gro92] for details-that are translatable to SAL and show how we preserve the RSL semantics in the SAL output. The third problem, extending RSL to include transition systems and temporal logic assertions, is discussed in Sect. 3.
Type declarations
As the type system provided by SAL is quite similar to the basic RSL type system, the normal translator uses the former as a base for the translation of type declarations. There are, however, some exceptions to this rule:
Integers SAL provides an INTEGER type that can be used to model the type Int in RSL. Because both types are infinite by definition, it is necessary to impose a restriction over the possible values in the type. This is rather a constraint towards the finiteness of the model than a syntactic constraint imposed by the SAL language but it should also be addressed by the translator. The solution adopted is to translate the RSL type Int as the SAL subrange type [IntLow .
. IntHigh], where IntLow and IntHigh are constants defined by the translator but which can be modified by the user to allow experimentation with the model and properties under verification.
Naturals
The RSL type Nat is translated as [0 .
. NatHigh].
Unions Unions are shorthands in RAISE that allow the omission of constructors and destructors that are compulsory in the case of the variant type. Such an "implicit constructor" is not accepted in SAL: its syntax requires the presence of a constructor for every possible field in a variant. Due to this restriction, the union type is not translatable into SAL. As the translator can handle variant declarations, this restriction does not turn to be a serious expressiveness limitation because any union can easily be expressed as a variant.
Finally, the collection types (sets, maps and lists) require a more complex translation scheme as there is no support in SAL for any of them. In general, the strategy for translating sets and maps relies on an encoding based on total functions. A set is translated as a predicate (the set's characteristic function) and a map as a total function from the domain type to the range type. Having the implementation based on this approach allows the definition of the operations over sets and maps by means of intensive use of LAMBDA expressions. Lists are typically defined as recursive structures, which are not supported by SAL. Translating them as functions from their index sets to the element type is perhaps possible, but raises a number of problems, and we eventually decided not to accept them.
The translation procedure for maps has to handle several issues arising not only from the way functions are handled in SAL but also from RAISE's definition of maps:
• A map might not be defined over all possible values in its domain type. In RSL, a map application over a value not in the map's domain will return the RSL expression swap, a form of deadlock. Moreover, SAL does not provide partial function support, hence, partial constructions are not directly translatable. To solve this problem, the translator modifies the map by creating a "wrapper" over the range by means of a variant declaration of the form:
This approach turns the map into a total function (the elements in the domain type that were not included in the map, are now mapped to the special value nil) and allows the encoding of the map as a total function in SAL.
• Maps might be non-deterministic (for example, [ 1 → 2, 1 → 3 ]). A map application to a value mapped to multiple values is equivalent to the internal choice among the possible results of the map. Even though it is possible to produce this kind of behaviour in SAL, the required implementation would make the whole model checking process very inefficient. We prefer to regard this as an error, which is consistent with the advice in the RAISE method. To expose this error, an enumerated map such as this would be modelled as if it had been
The union operator between maps is defined by the SAL translator as a partial function: the domains of its arguments are required to be disjoint. So the nondeterminism in the original map is discovered in the CC version as the incorrect application of a partial function.
• Maps can be infinite. Due to model checking finiteness requirement, possible infinite constructions can not be translated, so infinite maps are also not accepted in the translator.
Function definitions
An explicit value definition which defines a function with a name that is unique in the scheme that holds it, translates directly to a SAL explicit function (the semantics of total functions are equivalent between RAISE and SAL). As SAL does not support overloading, if there is a clash in the function name (i.e. the function is overloaded in the specification), an error is reported during the translation. A similar situation arises when overloading operators (which is also a feature not supported in SAL); the translator also reports an error in this case.
Partial function encoding.
We rewrite all the preconditions of a function (explicitly stated by the user in the specification) as subtype restrictions over the arguments' types. With this simple transformation, the problem of partial functions is reduced to an environment of total functions with subtypes as argument types. The satisfaction of partial function's preconditions can be verified using the CC version.
Function type expressions
Function type expressions are, in general, translated as regular SAL functions. There are, however, two exceptions to this rule: curried functions are transformed on-the-fly into lambda expressions, and values with functional types are declared to be of function type (using the total function type provided in SAL) and the value expression (usually, a lambda expression) is assigned to it.
Set expressions
As mentioned in Sect. 2.3, sets are modelled as their characteristic functions: total functions that return true when applied to a member of the set, and false otherwise.
All RSL set expressions are accepted, as illustrated in Table 1 . 
Let expressions
As SAL supports let expressions that introduce simple bindings, the translation mechanism for the simplest case of let expressions is straightforward.
On the other hand, the translation of case expressions with bindings involving products is the most complex one due to SAL's restriction to only single bindings in let expressions (i.e. only bindings of the form {Identifier :
. This restriction prevents let expressions of the form "let (a,b) P in" (where P is of product type) being directly translatable into SAL. To solve this problem, the translator uses SAL's feature to access product fields, by an index which is the field's position inside the product. Using this approach, the translation mechanism is performed as follows. Suppose e is an expression representing a pair of type Prod (here and in the sequel, the RAISE original code will be shown on the left and the generated SAL code on the right):
Case expressions
As SAL does not provide a case construction, case expressions are translated as nested sequences of if expressions. The case when the pattern in the case expression is a product is handled in a field-by-field manner. In particular, when the inner patterns are literal values, the expression is handled in a similar way to the value literal one.
For example, assuming that x is an Int × Int product, the translation will be performed as follows:
On the other hand, record patterns require additional tasks to be performed during the translation process. The semantics of a record pattern are a matching condition plus a binding of free names within the pattern to components of the value being matched. We use SAL's recognisers to generate the matching condition, and LET expressions for the bindings. An example of the translation is shown below. 
The potential incompleteness of a case expression is another issue for the CC version.
Define-before-use rule
This is a syntactic restriction that simplifies many tasks during compilation and SAL adopts it but RAISE does not. As the goal is to translate from a language where ordering is not important to one where it is, a sorting procedure must be implemented before translation in order to cope with the define-before-use rule in SAL.
The approach taken to solve this problem is to generate an extra pass over the abstract syntax tree (AST) extracted from the RAISE code and to generate a new syntax tree using an intermediate format, where the declarations are sorted according to the dependency among declarations in the RAISE original specification.
In particular, the sorting procedure that is used during this pass is based on the sorting algorithm used in the PVS translator [DG02] . Roughly speaking, the algorithm collects the set of declarations for each module and tries to reduce it iteratively until reaching the empty set (successful termination) or a point where the set can not be reduced any further (a circular dependency exists among the declarations).
Essentially, the reduction algorithm tries to reduce the set by calculating the dependencies of each element in the set and intersecting it with the set of unprocessed declarations. If the intersect operation results in an empty result, then the declaration's dependencies have already been sorted and the current declaration can be added to the sorted set. On the other hand, if, at any iteration, the result after processing the set of pending declarations is still the same, then there is a circular dependency among declarations that cannot be sorted and an error is reported.
This transformation of the original AST is carried out at the very beginning of the translation procedure, guaranteeing that the define-before-use rule is satisfied for all subsequent steps during the translation.
Bindings in function signatures and arguments
Bindings in RAISE typically occur inside let expressions and case expressions but also in functions. The latter can, in turn, be divided into two independent cases. The first case concerns bindings introduced in the formal parameters during the function declaration, like the names a and b in:
Prod Int × Int value:
The second case concerns bindings introduced by actual parameters during function application, as in the code (using the definition of the type Prod and function f from the previous example):
Bindings in these two particular cases are restricted to single or product bindings in RAISE. On the other hand, SAL does not allow any kind of bindings but the simple ones for functions.
The approach used to solve the problem depends on the situation and the rules are as follows:
• Bindings introduced in the function's formal declaration (i.e. unfolding one of the formal arguments as in the case of the function f in the first example). This case is solved with the same strategy used for product bindings within let expressions. In particular, a new argument name is generated for the formal argument and product field's identifiers are assigned to the identifiers introduced in the bindings. This association (from names in the bindings to product fields) is pushed during the function's body processing and used for look up every time a name occurrence is found inside the function. Following this approach, the first example will be translated as:
• Bindings introduced during function application. This case can be treated as two separate problems. The first arises when the actual arguments match with the unfolding of the formal parameters of the applied function (as in the case of function f1 in the second example). This case is the simplest one and can be solved by direct translation of the product expression (i.e. (a,b) in the example) as a product in SAL. Translated in this way, the product expression matches structurally with the product/abbreviated type in the argument. Using this rule, the translation of the function f1 in the second example would be:
On the other hand, the second case arises when the actual parameters must be unfolded to match the formal parameters (as in the case of function f2 in the second example). In this case, the solution is slightly more complex because SAL does not allow this kind of binding (the applied function is expecting more parameters than the provided ones and this is a syntactic error for SAL type checker). The approach taken is to unfold arguments into their fields on the fly in order to match the formal parameter list.
In the case of the function f2, for example, the translator will generate:
Limitations
Model checking requires that specifications are complete and defined. So types may not be abstract, and constants and functions must be explicitly defined (rather than by postconditions or axioms). Structures must be finite, so only finite sets and maps are supported, and with a maximum size defined at (SAL's) compile time, so recursive types and functions are not supported.
Extending RSL
Temporal logic model checking is essentially based on transition systems to represent the behaviour of the system under analysis and a temporal logic to state the properties that must be verified. As neither of these has a direct representation in RSL, a way to describe them must be added to the language. This section presents the extensions incorporated to RSL in order to support these two required features.
Transition systems
The model checking approach is based on the creation of a sound representation of the system under analysis and in computing the possible future states of the system by following all possible actions from every reachable state. It is then fundamental to be able to describe/define the transition system that the user wants to be taken as a model in order to verify properties using model checking.
We had a choice between allowing users to define the transition system or trying to generate it automatically from the specification. We decided on the former, since (a) it gives the users more freedom, including the possibility of defining more than one transition system, (b) it is not clear, for an arbitrary RSL specification, what the default transition system should be, and (c) modifying the transition system, especially the addition of variables, is a common method of getting the description to model check. Such modification would not be possible if the transition system were generated automatically.
We therefore defined an extension to RSL for transition systems. A detailed explanation and the grammar defining this extension can be found in [PG05] . This extension is meant to allow the user to represent behavioural aspects of the specification in a language based on guarded commands.
As an example of what can be expressed in this extension, consider a specification where a bounded stack of elements of (finite) type T is defined. The following transition system describes a possible model for the system description:
The symbol is used in transition systems to indicate a choice between the transitions (here push trans and pop trans), and also a choice in push trans between the values in type T.
From this short example, it is possible to see the declaration of a local variable (stack) that models the state of the transition system, initialized with the empty value. It is also possible to observe the guarded transitions that determine the evolution of the system. In particular, the first transition corresponds to a comprehended transition, a shorthand that is expanded, during model checking, to a choice of the guarded transitions obtained by instantiating e with each of the values in T. The last transition, on the other hand, shows a single transition that can be triggered when the stack is not empty.
LTL properties
An axiom e in RSL corresponds exactly to a SAL LTL assertion G(E), if E is the translation of e, so if we were satisfied with limiting the assertions to global ones we could use RSL axioms as SAL assertions. But to support general LTL assertions we incorporated another extension to RSL, allowing the user to write LTL assertions. For example, some possible assertions for the stack example above may be defined as follows:
Note from the example above that all assertions must refer to a transition system (TRANS in this case) and that LTL temporal operators G, F (future) and X (next) can be used. U (until), R (release) and W (weak until) are also available. The detailed grammar of the extension to state LTL properties in RSL and some examples can be found in [PG05] .
Handling confidence conditions: the CC version
Even though the translation following the shallow embedding described in Sect. 2 allows the (time) efficient verification of a wide variety of applicative specifications, the completeness of the whole approach is significantly diminished by the strong assumption imposed on the verification mechanism. The complementary approach, a deep embedding, is based on the idea of modelling the input language's semantics in the target language. This usually involves the construction within the target language of the input language's semantic domain. This approach generally produces a translator that is powerful in terms of what parts of the input language can be covered (ideally all) but typically inefficient in terms of running the translated code.
The fact that a model generated from a deep embedding of RAISE into SAL will be, in general, impractical (especially in the case of non-trivial specifications) makes this approach not viable for the main translation approach. On the other hand, it is possible to use it to generate a complementary CC model to the normal one produced using the shallow embedding. This CC model is used only to verify the satisfaction of confidence conditions. In this way, the CC version can be used to verify that the assumptions of the normal version are satisfied and that its results are sound.
It is worth mentioning that the CC version is meant to be analysed by a model checker and thus is still affected by the state explosion problem. In our case studies, the model generated by the CC version was usually two to three orders of magnitude bigger than the one generated by the normal version. This increment in the size of the model turned into longer verification times but the model checker was still able to handle them. Even in the case of big specifications (such as the Mondex electronic purse specification [GH07, GH08] ) the CC model of the specification was verifiable by the model checking engine.
The rest of this section is devoted to cover the logic framework used to deal with confidence conditions and the main issues arising from the translation using a deep embedding approach.
Lifting the type system
The purpose of the CC version is the verification of the assumptions made in the normal version: that confidence conditions are not violated. Towards this idea, it is necessary to include a bottom value (⊥) in the type system in order to be able to represent undefined values. In particular, it is necessary to capture the results returned by partial functions when called with values outside their application domains.
2 Given the lack of polymorphism in SAL, the ⊥ value is represented by defining a special type Nav ("not a value") and by lifting all the types in the specification with a place holder for a value of this new type. For example, the definition of the lifted integer type is Int_cc: TYPE = DATATYPE Int_cc(Int_val: Int_), Int_nav(Int_nav_val: Nav) END;
The lifting of the type system poses several challenges, as shown below:
Type maximality. Type equivalence in SAL's type checker is resolved as syntactic equality for data types. On the other hand, the inclusion of the Nav value lifts all the types in the generated code to SAL data types. This poses a problem regarding type checking and automatic castings (such as values in a subtype being used as values of the main type) being no longer valid due to the syntactic differences in their definitions as data types in the translation. The solution adopted was to reduce all type declarations and type expressions to their maximal type.
3
The satisfaction of subtype restrictions by the values used in the specification (subtype preservation) is achieved by verifying that the value is in the proper subtype at each point of usage (i.e. when used as argument in a function call, at the exit point of functions, at value initialization, etc.).
Built-in operators.
It is no longer possible to use the built-in operations from the target language (not only because of the syntactic differences in the types but also because of their lack of ability to handle the new Nav value). This is solved by redefining a prefix version of all RSL operators for each type involved.
Strictness. The operators are defined to be strict regarding the Nav value (i.e. if a Nav value is found, this value is directly propagated to the result of the function). This implies the modification of all the functions (and operators) to include verifications over their arguments to detect and propagate the Nav value. The purpose of strictness is to ensure (a) that the Nav value is not lost and (b) that the first Nav value that occurs is the one presented to users, so that they see the source of the problem.
Pre-and postconditions. As well as the fact that each of the function's arguments need to be checked for the Nav value, it is also necessary to include subtype satisfaction checks, and to check preconditions. To check subtypes, a special predicate, RSL is <type>, is generated for each subtype and used to carry out the subtype check at each function's entry point, and also to check that function results are within subtypes. Code is also included to check postconditions (which may be added to explicit function definitions in RSL).
Undefined logic values. The translator simulates a three-valued logic 4 on top of the model checker's classical two-valued one. Moreover, the strictness property preserved by all operations ensures the propagation of the Nav value to the upper levels and hence its detection. In some places, such as the conditions in IF expressions and the guards in guarded commands in the transition system, we need to flatten into the classical Boolean model, and we use a function is true. This function behaves as the identity function over values of type Boolean and maps Nav into the value FALSE. Constant values. Constant value definitions are another way of introducing inconsistency into the specification, by declaring a value for the constant that is outside of its type. A simple example of this situation is the definition n : Nat = −2, where the value being declared does not belong to the type. To detect this kind of situation in our lifted type system approach, verifications for the value with which constants are initialised are automatically generated at translation time. In particular, the example above will be translated as n : Int_cc = IF RSL_is_Nat(Int_cc(-2)) THEN Int_cc(-2) ELSE Int_nav(Value_n_not_in_subtype) ENDIF and an LTL assertion G(Int cc?(n)) generated. This assertion is of course invalid, and will be reported.
Lifted sets and maps. Allowing Navs in sets and maps would introduce an element of ambiguity (is a set undefined if one of its members is?); would considerably increase the size of the state space in many specifications; and would mean searching the set or map for Navs each time it is accessed. We therefore define a lifted set as a data type which is either a Nav or a set of non-lifted values, and similarly for maps. We therefore need to ensure when sets and maps are constructed or added to that we check for possible Navs, and follow the strictness principle. So, for example, adding a Nav to a set generates a Nav of the set's type.
Violation detection and reporting
We have seen that any confidence condition violation generates a Nav. We have also seen that strictness of all functions (including built-in ones) means that the Nav will persist in the calling tree. This leaves two issues: completeness of violation detection, and violation reporting to the user.
Detection
We use in the CC version the same transition system as in the normal version, apart from lifting the types of the variables, so that they can be assigned a Nav. But we replace the LTL assertions in the normal system with a single assertion that globally (i.e. in all reachable states) all of the transition system variables are not Navs. Validity of this assertion shows that there are no confidence condition violations in the running of the transition system. It is possible that there are some in code that is not exercised. As with model checking in general, we have to rely on users writing adequate transition systems.
Reporting
It would be convenient if we could output a message with useful information about any violation: what it was, where it occurred, and the values involved. This is the approach of the translators from RSL to SML and C++. But this is not so easy using a model checker: there is no string type for a start. We use an approach which gets as close as possible to this, reporting what the violation was and where it occurred. Consider the example translation below, where R is some subtype of Int: The example shows that if either the argument of inc is a Nav or the invoked function plus produces a Nav, this value is propagated. On the other hand, the function inc can generate three Nav values of its own.
If exercising the transition system can cause a Nav value to be generated then (because of strictness) it will appear in a transition system variable, the assertion that all such variables are not Navs will be invalidated, and the SAL model checker will provide a trace and the offending state, including the Nav value. The possible Nav values are like those illustrated above, so they look rather like strings and indicate what the violation is and where it occurred.
The translator also generates LTL properties to verify that constants are in their subtypes (as mentioned earlier), and that the types defined by the user are not empty. This includes Int and Nat, since the user can change the boundaries for these types.
The type Nav is an enumeration of the identifiers like Result of inc not in subtype. This type can become quite large, depending on the number of subtypes and functions in the specification. An alternative version, the "simple CC" version, is also generated by the translator, and this only has a single value in the Nav type. This is smaller than the CC version, and is adequate if there are no CC violations, but does not provide the debugging capability of the CC version with string-like identifiers.
Examples
The model checking functionalities of our extension to RAISE depend on having the appropriate transition system for the specification together with the properties to verify expressed by means of the temporal logic operators detailed in Sect. 3.2. As mentioned before, deriving the transition system associated with the set of applicative functions that comprise the specification is a task that cannot be performed automatically and it is left to the user.
This section illustrates our suggested approach towards the manual extraction of the transition system from the specification code: to construct a state machine using the top-level functions from the specification and to guard their activation with their preconditions. We do so by outlining two examples which have been model checked with SAL after translation from RSL. 
Digital Multiplexed Radio Telephone System
The system is illustrated in Fig. 1 . A central station is directly connected to the public switched telephone network (PSTN). A number of remote stations are connected to the central station by radio (microwave) connections. This kind of switch is intended for use in areas with scattered populations separated by rugged terrain or sea where it would be expensive to lay telephone cables.
There are only two microwave frequencies, one for transmission by the central station, and one for transmissions by the remotes. Multiplexing must be used to support a number of telephone connections at once. Since the system also uses digital rather than analogue signals it is described as Digital Multiplexed. Connections from the central station to the remotes are handled by Time Division Multiplexing (TDM) [Ha90] . The central station sends a continual sequence of frames of information, receivable by all the remotes. Each frame takes a certain amount of time to send and receive. The frames are conceptually divided into a number of time slots, and each time slot corresponds to a single trunk. So, for example, if a remote is allocated trunk numbered 1, it will accept the information arriving during the period corresponding to time slot 1 in each frame, and ignore others which are not currently allocated to it. There are only a limited number of trunks (fixed by the length of a frame), and they must be allocated and deallocated dynamically. We can consider trunks as dynamic virtual connections between the central station and the remotes. So a remote may connect one of its subscribers to a trunk. The central station may connect two trunks from different remotes, so connecting their subscribers, or may connect a trunk to the PSTN, so connecting a remote's subscriber to the PSTN. At any one time a trunk might be unused (free), or allocated to a remote. It is easy to ensure the central station keeps track of which trunks are currently allocated to which remotes, less easy to ensure that the remotes' information about what trunks they are currently allocated is consistent with the central station's information.
Telephonic data from remotes to central is handled similarly, by a scheme called Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA). Our remote will transmit during the time slot 1 and not during time slots which it is not allocated. Provided all the clocks are synchronised, and provided the trunk management is handled correctly so that each trunk is allocated to at most one remote, all the incoming information will be received by the central station: no two remote stations will transmit simultaneously on the same trunk. A detailed view of the timing requirements involves also knowing what the transmission time delay is between each remote and central. TDM/TDMA is also used for communications between communications satellites and ground stations. Then it becomes more complicated, because the satellites move relative to ground stations and the time delays vary. For our system the delays are constant.
Both TDM and TDMA have portions of the frames reserved for management information, and these portions are used for trunk request and allocation. Management message space is scarce, and there is no guard against clashes when used from remote to central, so management messages are minimised.
An example sequence of messages is the successful establishment of a connection from a subscriber on remote r1 to a subscriber on remote r2:
1. Remote r1 sends a trunk req(r1) on the management channel. 2. Central allocates a trunk, tr1, and sends trunk alloc(r1, tr1) on the management channel. 3. Remote r1 sends a connect(n) on tr1, where n is the number it wants to connect to. 4. Central calculates that subscriber n is on remote r2, allocates a trunk, say tr2, connects tr2 to tr1, and sends connect(n, tr2) on the management channel. 5. Remote r2 recognises that n is one of its numbers, connects subscriber n to tr2, and sends ack on tr2. 6. Central sends connect ack on tr1. 7. Remote r1 connects the original subscriber to tr1 and the connection is complete.
There are of course other messages to deal with no trunk being available at step 2 or step 4, and for subscriber n being busy.
Stations need to keep careful track of the trunks. At step 2 central marks tr1 as pending, at step 4 it cancels the pending status of tr1 and marks tr1 and tr2 as connected. Remote r1 regards tr1 as usable after step 2, and remote r2 regards tr2 as usable after step 4.
Suppose after a successful connection subscriber n puts the phone down first. The sequence of messages is then:
1. Remote r2 sends a cancel on tr2. 2. Central disconnects the trunks and sends a disconnect on tr1. 3. Remote r1 sends a cancel on tr1.
Central receives the cancel on tr1.
Central marks tr2 as free and tr1 as pending after step 1, and makes tr1 free after step 4. Remote r2 regards tr2 as not usable after step 1, and remote r1 regards tr1 as not usable after step 3.
The description seems to imply perfect message transmission, but of course in practice there will be lower-level protocols to deal with transmission failures or clashes of management messages sent by remote stations.
The main correctness criterion for this algorithm is captured in a property no confusion that says that no two remotes both regard a trunk as usable.
A second important condition to be checked is that trunks do not get "lost", i.e. become unallocatable. The condition, called no loss, is that the union of the connected, pending and free trunks is equal to the set of all trunks.
To check that no confusion is always true by model checking we simplified the original specification (which dealt with the states of subscribers' phones and also in more detail with the PSTN). We modelled the management (in and out) channels to each remote and each trunk (in and out) with a queue of length 2. The multiple channels allow the possibilities of management and remote messages overtaking each other, and for management messages to different remotes taking different times. Transitions are generally enabled when there is a message on a channel and the channel for the response is not full. For example, the transition for the central station denying a trunk request is
This is a choice over all remote station identifiers. A no alloc message can be sent to remote r when 1. there is a trunk req message at the head of the mgt in channel for remote r 2. the mgt out queue for remote r is not full 3. there are no free trunks and the result is to send (enq) a no alloc message to remote r and to consume (deq) the trunk req message.
Changes to the model
To make the model checkable using SAL we had to make a number of changes.
Finite remotes
We have just two remote stations. Finite trunks We have three trunks.
Finite PSTN connections We have two PSTN connections.
Finite length queues The queues are all length two.
This kind of reduction to a small state space is standard for model checking, with obvious dangers of concealing errors that would only appear in a larger state.
Also significant is the transcription that needs to be done to create the transitions. In the original specification there was, for example, a function handle mgt in that dealt with central's response to all messages that could be sent on the mgt in channel. The trunk deny transition shown above corresponds to just one part of this function. We need to split the function because we need in the guard to include the non-emptiness of the response channel, and this can vary according to the incoming message and other state variables. It is in any case good practice to split the transitions as much as possible as then each transition in general affects fewer variables, which makes it more likely that SAL can cope, and the different labels for transitions make traces of errors easier to read.
At the same time of course, the generation of a number of transitions from a single function in the original specification increases the possibility of transcription errors: that the model being model-checked differs from the model originally specified.
For these reasons we recommend that model checking is used as a design debugging technique, rather than regarding it as providing design verification.
Results
For benefits of model checking we note two issues which model-checking helped with:
1. The original design of the protocol allowed remotes to send a cancel message back to central if they received a disconnect message on a trunk they had already canceled. Central was allowed to ignore cancel messages when the trunk was not in use. But model checking shows this could lead to no confusion being false. 2. The original design of the protocol gave precedence to management messages, but it was not clear if this is necessary. Model checking shows that it is not necessary. The number of possible states is probably larger (model checking takes longer) but the basic safety properties of no confusion and no loss are true for both versions.
The original work reported in [DG96, DGJM02] used proof to verify the properties of the specification. The problem with the extra cancel message in the protocol was discovered during the proof; this is a very expensive way to discover bugs! All of the proof that had been completed when the discovery was made had to be redone. Checking the second issue would have required another proof, and was not attempted.
Some simple "liveness" checks were also done. It is difficult in such systems to generate useful liveness conditions, since in general there is no guarantee for example that a call can be connected, even if there are enough resources at the start. Resources may be claimed by other calls, and either end can cancel at any point. Instead we asserted some simple conditions which we expected to be false. The generation of the counter examples shows the possibility of various states being reached. The conditions we used were:
• Not all trunks could be allocated. Since there are three trunks and two PSTN connections the disproof showed the establishment of both a remote-remote call and a remote-PSTN call.
• All trunks being allocated implies that from then on the set of free trunks is never equal to all the trunks. Disproving this shows that all trunks can become free from none being free, an example of a "no loss" condition.
• Each of the queues can never be full.
On a 2.53 GHz Pentium with 2 GB of memory it took 17 min to check there are no deadlocks (necessary for soundness with SAL) and 30 min to model check. Confidence condition checking took 65 min for the standard version and 49 min for the simple version. No confidence condition violations were discovered.
Mondex electronic purse
As a response to the international grand challenge in verified software engineering [Hoa03, HM05, Hoa06, JOW06] a number of research groups worked on the same verification problem, the Mondex electronic purse. Mondex [Inc, IE97] is a financial system that utilizes smart cards as electronic purses. Each card stores financial value (equivalent to cash) as electronic information on a microchip and provides operations for making financial transactions with other cards via a communication device. The system is distributed without any central controller.
It is rather important that such a financial system does not contain bugs. Therefore Logica (a commercial software house) in collaboration with the University of Oxford specified and refined the Mondex smart card system in the Z [Spi92] formal specification language, and proved by hand that the system satisfies some required security properties. This resulted in an assurance at ITSEC [ITS] level E6, ITSEC's highest granted security-level classification which is equivalent to Common Criteria level EAL7.
The aim of the project in 2006 was to see how much of the proof could be done mechanically, and if possible automatically. A proof was done in RAISE [GH08] and towards the end of 2006 the translator to SAL became available and so we also model checked the specification.
The Mondex protocol
The Mondex protocol for transferring an amount (value), v, from one purse, P1 (the "from purse"), to another purse, P2 (the "to purse"), includes the following key steps:
1. P2 sends a request about transferring v from P1 to P2 2. P1 receives the request and sends the amount v to P2 3. P2 receives the amount v and sends an acknowledgement to P1
It should be noted that the protocol can be stopped at any point by either purse aborting the transaction, such as by a card losing power. If e.g. P2 aborts after P1 has sent the amount but before P2 has received it, it must be logged that the amount is "lost"; money may be lost from the purse balances but not from the system as a whole. It is also possible for messages to be lost.
It was required to prove two properties of Mondex:
1. The total amount in circulation (in purse balances and "in transit") does not increase; i.e. Mondex cannot be exploited to create money. 2. All money in the system (in purses, in transit or "lost") is accounted. This is modelled as the sum of money in purses, in transit or "lost" being constant.
It is interesting to note that these conditions provide for security for the bank but not for individual customers: a silent, unauthorised transfer of money from one purse to another would satisfy these conditions.
The three key messages (request, value and acknowledgement) are encrypted to guard against eavesdropping, and also contain "sequence numbers" from each of the purses involved which monotonically increase by random amounts and which provide protection against the replay of old messages. They act rather like nonces in authentication protocols: each purse holds a PayDetails record containing the identities of the two purses, their sequence numbers, and the amount. This record is included in each of the three messages, and checked against the PayDetails stored in the purse.
As well as operations to take the purses through the protocol there are operations to reliably allow the purse logs to be archived and then removed from the purses: otherwise they would soon run out of memory.
Changes to the model
As with the telephony example we had to make a number of things finite, and indeed quite small:
• There are only two purses.
• Money is in the range 0..3 only.
• Transfers are always of one unit of money (so that the amount does not need to be included in messages).
• All the operations and messages concerned with archiving logs are removed (as we think these operations could be model checked separately).
• Sequence numbers are in the range 0..3, and always incremented by just 1.
The last simplification seems particularly drastic, because it reduces the number of "runs" of the protocol: if the sequence numbers are restricted to 0..n then at most n transfers can take place. So, for example, if Money were in the range 0..4 we could "prove" that a purse with a balance of four would never become empty! We also made some changes to split the state into smaller components. Such modifications do not reduce the size of the state, or change the behaviour, but they make the specification more accessible to the optimisations used by SAL:
• The "ether" containing a set of three possible message types is replaced by three sets each containing the contents of one message type.
• The logs are separated from the purses.
• Some data types are split into a number of disjoint subtypes, and assertions that are universal quantifications over them are split into a number of assertions each over one of the subtypes. For example, the range we use to represent PayDetails was split up into four disjoint subranges and assertions modified accordingly.
• Extra state variables are introduced to simplify the LTL assertions.
For example, a pair of state components hold the total money in circulation in the previous and current states, allowing for a simple formulation of the assertion that money in circulation does not increase. We went through several iterations to get a system that SAL could check, and it is interesting to compare the first version of one of the transitions, with the final one. The original version of the transition to start the "from" purse is simple, with a guard function and one to express the change to the single "world" state:
( n : Name, cpd : CounterPartyDetails • [ startFrom ] canStartFrom(n,startFrom(cpd),world) −→ world startFrom(n,startFrom(cpd),world))
The final version has 4 distinct transitions, split firstly by purse (as we have just 2 purses) and then by whether the transaction will cause a write to a log (because the purse is initially involved at a critical point in another transaction, which must be aborted) or not. Here are the two transactions for purse 1:
canStartFromLog(purse1, cpd) −→ log1 log1 ∪ {index(pdAuth(purse1))}, purse1 startFrom(purse1, cpd), lost if canAbortLogLoss(purse1, purse2, log2) then lost + 1 else lost end, previousTotalCirculating totalCirculating, totalCirculating inPurses(purse1 , purse2 ) + inTransit(purse1 , purse2 , log1 , log2 ))
canStartFromNoLog(purse1, cpd) −→ purse1 startFrom(purse1, cpd), previousTotalCirculating totalCirculating, totalCirculating inPurses(purse1 , purse2 ) + inTransit(purse1 , purse2 , log1 , log2 ))
We can see that there are now a number of distinct variables, previously part of "world", and we need only mention those which may change: SAL has a framing condition that variables not mentioned are not changed. SAL benefits greatly by having many transitions with few variables changed in each. At the same time it is clear that much of the original specification has been "unfolded" into the transition system, with consequent possibility of error. As with the telephony example we conclude that model checking is good for debugging a design, but less certain for verifying it.
Results
We were able to prove (for the simplified specification):
• the original Mondex requirements that money in circulation does not increase and that all money is accounted, • simple liveness in the sense that -an empty purse can become non-empty, -a non-empty purse can become empty, and, -money can be lost,
• all of the state invariants, • all of the confidence conditions. On a 2.53 GHz Pentium, model checking the requirements and simple liveness properties took 10 min for the deadlock check and 2 min for the assertions. Checking the invariants (using a simpler model as fewer variables are needed) took 30 s for deadlock checking and 1 min for the invariants. The confidence condition check took 18 min (and 14 for the simple version). These seem quite low times, but increasing the maximum sequence number from 3 to 4 causes SAL to run out of memory (with 2 GB of memory).
Being able to state and check all the state invariants is a very useful exercise, particularly if you are doing a proof. We had done the proof of Mondex (via the RAISE translator to PVS [Hun02] ) before the translator to SAL was available. There were a number of versions and proof attempts, as we tried to find the best way to do the proof. The invariant on the state for Mondex is complicated-our version had 14 conjuncts-and proving these invariant for each of the 11 operations was a major undertaking. In one version we had a conjunct which was attractive and very useful in proving our requirements, but which eventually proved not to be maintained by one operation. If we had had the SAL version available we could have discovered this automatically before wasting a lot of proof effort.
As noted above, when we ran the CC version of Mondex no violations were detected. To check that it was actually capable of detection, we introduced some CC violations and checked they were detected. For example, we changed one clause of a function canStartFromEaFrom from balance(p) ≥ 1 to balance(p) > 1. The results of normal model-checking were unaltered, but the CC version produced a counter-example in which the state of the second purse is a NaV:
This indicated that the error was the non-satisfaction of the precondition of startFromEaFrom in the context WORLD2INV. The precondition of startFromEaFrom is precisely the function canStartFromEaFrom that we changed.
Use of the CC version of SAL increases our confidence in the quality of the specification. It also increases our confidence that the proofs of confidence conditions-which are partly generated as Type Check Conditions in PVS after translation, and otherwise generated by the translator to PVS as extra lemmas to be proved-can be done. Again model-checking is a useful precursor to the effort of proof.
Conclusions, related and future work
The aim of this work was to provide a way to automatically verifying the biggest possible applicative subset of the RAISE specification language. For doing so, we have selected model checking as the verification technique (mainly because of its automated nature) and decided to implement the verification process as a translator into the Symbolic Analysis Laboratory.
In the process of defining the translation procedure, we have devised two complementary approaches. The first, normal one is a very efficient encoding (based on the shallow-embedding approach) for verifying user properties but with significant assumptions, that no confidence conditions are violated. The second, CC one, based on the deep-embedding idea, is not meant to verify user properties but to verify the assumptions of the normal version.
We have briefly described the issues involved in translating from a wide-spectrum specification language to a model checking language, and looked in detail at the main problems faced during the translation process, and at how we modelled the RSL semantics in particular cases.
We have also constructed a tool that implements this translation. The tool, in particular, has served to confirm the suitability of the approach described in this paper and can now be used to model check specifications in the applicative style. The tool has been used, for example, in model checking the RSL specification of the Mondex electronic purse [GH08] and in checking relay interlocking systems for the Danish Railways [HBK08] .
Related work
In the context of formal or rigorous methods for software development, several attempts have been made to incorporate model checking techniques given the advantage that software specifications are, essentially, abstractions of the desired system. In particular, there have been several approaches to the incorporation of model checking techniques in order to verify whether a given property is preserved throughout the whole development process or at a certain abstraction stage [CW96] .
Some well known examples of adding model checking functionalities into formal languages can be found in relation to CSP [Hoa85] . One of the most popular CSP tools is FDR [Eur] . FDR is often described as a model checker, but is technically a refinement checker, in that it converts two CSP process expressions into labelled transition systems, and then determines whether one of the processes is a refinement of the other within some specified semantic model (traces, failures, or failures/divergence). Recent work with RSL has produced a translator of applicative RSL processes into CSP which can be model checked with FDR [TG08, VG08, VTG08 ].
This refinement-based approach is particularly suitable when trying to verify the stepwise development of systems, but it has, however, obvious disadvantages over other temporal-logic-based approaches, where the specification of temporal properties is done in a more natural way (given the conciseness and clearness of temporal logics for describing temporal properties). The work translating RSL to CSP was also extended to support the checking of LTL assertions with FDR [VGTG09] .
Another important case (because it uses the approach of translating the specification into a model checking language) is that presented in [SW05] regarding the Z notation [WD96] . In this work, the authors propose a translation into a model checker (SAL) by adopting a blocking semantics for the operations. They mainly present a set of mathematical libraries in order to provide support for sets, relations, functions (encoded as relations and thus providing support for partial functions), sequences and bags. As RAISE is much closer to Z than to CSP, this seems to be an important model to follow with the aim of adding model checking functionalities to the RAISE language. There are, however, two main disadvantages in this approach:
• Performance. Even though the encoding functions as relations allows a straightforward translation of partial functions, this implementation is extremely inefficient when compared with the performance of SAL's regular functions.
• Predicate-based encoding. The approach taken to translate most Z constructions is based on predicates, i.e.
boolean expressions that take an extra argument and return true if that argument corresponds to the actual result of the application of that function. This approach is totally unsuitable for modeling RAISE applicative constructs.
Regarding Z, there have also been other efforts to translate it into languages such as PVS [SCSW97] and Isabelle/HOL [KSW96] but these tools are proof languages, not suitable for temporal logic verification and, thus, not comparable with the present work. A similar approach has also been used for Z extensions such as CSP-OZ, CSP-Z and Object-Z but using FDR's functional language facilities as the target language in the translation of state-based aspects of the original specification. Given the fact that FDR's input language is quite expressive, this approach allows a straightforward translation of most Z predicates (sequences and sequence operations for example), yet with considerable loss of abstraction. As mentioned above, FDR is not a temporal logic model checker but a refinement checker. Thus, for a given model M, the temporal logic assertion that should be validated on it must first be transformed into a model in order to then use the FDR tool to verify if this model is refined by M.
In the context of the B method [Abr96] , significant academic and industrial effort has been invested in providing a comprehensive verification toolkit [Abr88, NS94, BLS05, MAV05] . In the context of model checking, the most relevant work is the ProB tool [LB03] . ProB provides two main verification functionalities: (a) a consistency checker, used to verify the invariants for a given machine; and (b) a refinement checker, similar in spirit to FDR, used to prove the refinement between two B machines. In comparison to our work, the refinement checking functionalities in ProB are more comparable with the RSL to CSP translator mentioned at the beginning of this section. The consistency checker functionality, on the other hand, does not cover LTL or any form of temporal logic properties (as they are not part of the B method) and is mostly intended as a consistency checker for B machines. Part of this task is done in the CC version of our tool. For user defined invariants, they can be expressed as global assertions using the G LTL operator described in Sect. 3.2.
Finally, there has been recent interest in combining the automatic verification features of model checking with theorem proving in order to cope with the state explosion problem and to deal with infinite/undefined behaviour or structures [FW06] . With this approach, the outcome generally uses the exploratory nature of model checking assisted by one or more theorem provers to decide when exploring the state space (the assistance of the theorem provers is essentially needed when dealing with models that contain undefined or infinite constructs).
This approach has been successfully applied in [FW07, Fre05] to the Circus specification language [WC01] . In this work specifications are first transformed into a form of automaton (called a Predicate Transition System) and this model searched for witnesses representing flaws in the original specification. All the aspects that are not automatically verified by this stage are then passed as verification conditions to a stack of theorem provers that try to discharge them either automatically or with the user's assistance. This idea is not easily applicable to our work due to the need of implementing a model checker tailored to RAISE (for a discussion about the convenience of using a translation for this work see [PG06] ) in order to be able to handle the required interaction between the model checker and the theorem provers.
Future work
We have already planned how to extend this work to include RSL imperative specifications, but have not started to implement the extension.
It will be interesting to explore the SAL's construct IMPLEMENTS that allows the usage of model checking's exhaustive state exploration in order to verify if there is a refinement/abstraction relationship between two modules. With this construction, it may be possible to automatically verify the RSL refinement relation.
Finally, we are interested in exploring ways of formally showing the correctness of the translation approach we have been using to generate the SAL model. By this we mean a way of proving semantic equivalence between the original RAISE specification and the generated SAL model. Given the complexity of addressing the correctness of any translation strategy as a whole, an alternative would be trying to derive the translation using the algebraic compilation approach [Sam93] , allowing us to argue the correctness of the translator by construction.
